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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Issue Paper discusses how technology has overtaken
the traditional ways the states tax the income of “content
providers” that operate broadcast and cable networks,
sell advertising, and produce content such as movies and
television programs. This content is licensed at wholesale
to distributors and along with the advertising, is watched
by customers of these distributors on their televisions,
smart phones, tablets, gaming consoles, and computers—
either in their homes or on the move.
The so-called “model” for taxing multistate businesses like
content providers--the Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act (UDITPA)--was developed in 1957 and has
been adopted in whole or in part by most states. Obviously,
a tax system built on a 1957 foundation cannot begin to
cope with today’s highly technological and digital world.
Without the benefit of a model that can accommodate the
21st century, the states have been left on their own to try
to modernize their laws. The result has been constant
change and flux.
This Paper endorses a new approach to the income
taxation of content providers, one unaffected by, rather
than becoming antiquated by, tomorrow’s technology.
The approach assigns receipts of content providers based
on the commercial domicile of their customers—an
approach that will not be overtaken by technology and
one that introduces stability, predictability, and certainty
into the tax system and reduces litigation. Moreover, the
rule captures the location of the customers and the true
market of the content providers.
The rule is free from the conceptual and administrative
defects that plague other approaches, such as an audience
factor or a population factor. Assigning sales based on the
customer’s commercial domicile would free policy makers
from the need for constant tinkering with the tax law every
time a technological innovation led to a new way of doing
business for a content provider. This rule has already been
adopted by some states.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The law is typically reactive, addressing yesterday’s
problems. In an area of slow moving change and
developments, this commonplace approach is acceptable.
But in a field of rapid technological innovation, yesterday’s
problems have nothing to do with today’s. Yesterday’s
science fiction fantasies are today’s realities.
This paper discusses how technology has overtaken the
traditional ways the states tax the income of companies
like NBCUniversal, CBS, Disney, Time Warner, Fox and
Viacom. These companies operate cable and broadcast
networks, sell advertising and produce content such as
movies and television programs. This content is licensed
at wholesale to distributors and along with the advertising,
is watched by customers of these distributors on their
televisions, smart phones, tablets, gaming consoles, and
computers—either in their homes or on the move. For
ease of presentation, these companies are referred to as
“content providers.”
The content and advertising is distributed through five
types of distributors: TV station affiliates (e.g., the local
Fox, NBC, CBS, or ABC station);1 national cable system
operators (e.g., Comcast, Charter Communications, Time
Warner Cable, Cox Communications);2 satellite television
(e.g., Dish TV, DirecTV);3 telecom distributors (e.g., AT&T,
Verizon); and Internet distributors (e.g., Netflix, Hulu,
Vudu, Amazon, RIM, Google, Yahoo, Apple).4
With limited exceptions, the content providers do not
own or control any of these distributors. With the
exception of Comcast’s ownership of NBCUniversal, the
content providers are not owned or controlled by any of
the distributors.
The so-called “model” for taxing multistate businesses,
including content providers--the Uniform Division of
Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA)--was developed in
1957 and has been adopted in whole or in part by most
states. UDITPA was adopted when there were only 48
states, before the widespread use of color televisions,
the existence of satellite television, computers, videos,
laptops, tablets, DVDs and smart phones. Hula Hoops, not
Hulu, were the country’s obsession when this so-called
“model” tax act was enacted. Amazingly, UDITPA has
never been amended.5
Obviously, a tax system built on a 1957 foundation cannot
begin to cope with today’s highly technological and
digital world. Without the benefit of a model that can
accommodate the 21st century, the states have been left
on their own to try to modernize their laws. The result has
been constant change and flux and the lack of consistency
among the states, which sacrifices fundamental goals
of a sound tax system. The law generally, and tax law

specifically, should provide certainty and stability, allowing
businesses to invest confidently and state legislatures
to predict their annual revenue so they can plan their
spending. Tax rules should not be overtaken and rendered
obsolete by new ways of doing business, especially in an
area marked by rapid technological innovation.
Taxpayers and state governments should not have to
resort to costly and distracting litigation to fit new business
practices into outdated statutes. Nor should legislatures
be constantly asked to shift their attention and resources to
amending their tax statutes to keep up with new practices.
Constant change creates an unfavorable business climate
and discourages investment. By contrast, tax rules that can
accommodate unpredictable technological developments
are to be welcomed by taxpayers and state governments.
This Paper endorses a new approach to the income
taxation of content providers, one unaffected by, rather
than becoming antiquated by, tomorrow’s technology. The
goal is to provide an approach that will provide certainty,
stability, and predictability, consistent with the guiding
principles of a state corporate income tax.
To appreciate the issues involved in the state taxation of
content providers, the difficulties that have arisen, and a
solution to the problem, Section II below provides a brief
introduction to the structure of a state corporate income
tax.6 Particular emphasis is on the sales factor, which is at
the heart of this Paper and poses the greatest challenge
for content providers. Traditional ways of calculating the
sales factor are inadequate. Section III provides a solution
to the sales factor: assigning receipts based on the state of
the commercial domicile of a content provider’s customer,
an approach that has already been adopted by Florida,
Illinois, Michigan, North Carolina and Oregon.

II. THE STRUCTURE
OF A STATE CORPORATE
INCOME TAX
A. Overview
Almost all the states have a corporate income tax in
order to raise revenue from those doing business within
their borders. These states face a common challenge:
how much of the profits of a multistate business are they
entitled to tax?
To use a metaphor, the overall profits of a multistate
corporation can be viewed as constituting the size of a
pizza pie. The challenge for a state is to determine the
slice of the pizza that it can appropriately tax.
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Every state follows the UDITPA approach, which
determines a state’s “slice” through the use of a formula.
This method is known as formulary apportionment
because a formula is used to apportion the pie, that is, to
determine a state’s slice.
UDITPA sets forth the following formula:7
Income Taxable by a State8 = Corporation’s Total
Business Income × 1/3 (Sales Factor9 + Payroll Factor10 +
Property Factor11).
A corporation determines its tax in State A by first
calculating its total business income under State A law.12
This amount represents a corporation’s preapportionment
tax base—the size of the pizza pie.
The corporation then calculates its apportionment
percentage under the formula. Next, the corporation
multiplies its total business income by the apportionment
percentage. The result is the amount of the business
income of the corporation that is apportioned to State
A. The final step is to apply the state’s rate schedule to
determine the corporation’s tax liability and to reduce that
amount by any available credits.
The use of property and payroll in the formula reflects
the capital and labor that contribute to the generation of
income. The sales factor makes the formula politically
attractive to states in which the corporation’s customers
are located. The sales factor is commonly described as
reflecting the corporation’s market, that is, where its
customers are located.
The UDITPA formula has the virtue of using factors
(property, payroll and sales) that are readily known to the
taxpayer and that can be verified by a tax administration.
Consequently, an advantage of the formula is that it divides
income, which cannot be easily assigned geographically,
using factors that can be located geographically, in a
politically acceptable manner.
Around the 1970’s, some states started to deviate from the
UDITPA evenly-weighted, three-factor formula in order to
encourage economic development. A few states started
to double weight the sales factor with many more doing
so over the next few decades.13 Most recently, states have
adopted a formula using only a sales factor.14 The use of
only a sales factor places a premium on how it is calculated
because any defects or weaknesses will be magnified and
not offset by the property and payroll factors.

B. Calculating the Sales Factor
The heart of this Paper concerns calculating the sales
factor. As the UDITPA formula above indicates, the more
sales that are assigned to a state, the larger the numerator

of the sales factor and consequently, the more income that
will be apportioned to that state. This is especially true in
states using only a sales factor.
UDITPA provides two different approaches to calculating
the sales factor: one for the receipts from the sale of
tangible personal property and one for all other activities,
which includes those provided by content providers.
1. Receipts from the Sale of Tangible Personal Property
Nearly every state employs the destination principle set
forth in UDITPA for determining whether a sale of tangible
property will be included in its receipts factor.15 Under the
destination principle, tangible personal property shipped
or delivered to customers in the taxing state will be
included in the numerator of that state’s receipts factor.
In the case of a sale by a manufacturer to a distributor,
this rule assigns all the receipts to where the goods were
delivered. That result recognizes that the distributor is
the customer of the manufacturer. The manufacturer
would not assign any of its sales to the states in which the
distributor sold the goods because the customers of the
distributor are not the customers of the manufacturer.16
Put differently, there is no “look through” rule whereby the
sale by the manufacturer is assigned to the state of the
distributor’s customer. Yet some states would advocate
a “look through” rule for content providers through an
audience factor, discussed below.17
2. Receipts from all other Transactions
In the case of all other receipts, that is, receipts from
other than the sale of tangible personal property, such
as advertising services and the licensing of intangible
personal property, UDITPA provides that when the incomeproducing activity is performed in more than one state, as
would be true in the case of content providers, the receipts
are included in the numerator of the state in which a
greater proportion of the income-producing activity is
performed, as measured by “costs of performance.”18
The costs of performance rule is “all-or-nothing.” That is,
if 3% of the costs of performance are incurred in each of
32 states and 4% are incurred in another state, the entire
gross receipts will be assigned to that latter state.
Under UDITPA’s “all or nothing” approach, gross receipts
can be assigned to a state in which the taxpayer has no
customers (or can be assigned to a state different from
the one in which it has all of its customers). For example,
consider a corporation that produces all of its services in
State A and has only customers in State B. Under UDITPA,
all of the gross receipts would be assigned to State A,
even though the taxpayer has no customers there. None
would be assigned to State B, where all of its customers
are located.
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The “all or nothing” feature of UDITPA’s costs of
performance has proven controversial.19 Other criticism
is that costs of performance are likely to overlap with
the property and payroll factors producing a rule that
is too heavily biased to the place of production and one
that ignores the location of the taxpayer’s customers.
These features can interfere with attempts at attracting
businesses to locate or expand in a state. For example,
a corporation moving its operations to a state might find
that all of its income becomes taxable in that state, even
though all of its customers are located elsewhere.
Criticism of UDITPA’s treatment of gross receipts from
the sale of services or the licensing of intangible personal
property has increased over time. Compared with 1957
when UDITPA was adopted, many more interstate service
providers exist today. Moreover, interstate providers of
intangible property have also become commonplace
because of the Internet and the digital economy.
Because of the dissatisfaction with the costs of
performance rule, some states have distorted the concept
to reach a destination or market-based approach, such as
the use of an audience factor, the location of subscribers,
or the billing address of the end user. Other states
have adopted a more transparent approach, replacing
costs of performance with an explicit statute adopting a
destination or market-based approach. Still other states
have interpreted ambiguous statutes in problematic ways
to reach market-based results.20
One of the rationales for these market-based approaches,
even when not justified or supported by a statute, is to
use a “destination” rule for the receipts from intangible
property and advertising because such a rule would
mirror the destination rule for tangible personal property.
Ironically, however, although there is no “look through”
rule for tangible personal property, these market-based
approaches adopt one for the receipts from the licensing
of intangible personal property and the receipts from
advertising. These “look through” approaches focus
on the viewers of the intangible property or advertising
and consider those persons to be the content providers’
market, even though the providers actually license their
content to a distributor and not to the viewer. In addition
to this conceptual defect, some of these market-based
approaches are difficult to apply and can be manipulated
by taxpayers.21

C. Alternative Apportionment
Even in 1957 when UDITPA was adopted, it was clear
that its rules could not anticipate or adequately address
all situations. “One size could not fit all.” Accordingly,
UDITPA Section 18 sets forth what is commonly
known as alternative or equitable apportionment. This
constitutionally mandated, exculpatory provision, having
a statutory counterpart even in states not adopting

UDITPA, provides that if the allocation and apportionment
provisions do not fairly represent the extent of a taxpayer’s
business activity in a state, the taxpayer may petition for,
or the tax administrator may require, any other method
that will result in a reasonable and equitable allocation
and apportionment of the taxpayer’s income. Section
18 acts as a safety valve, allowing tax administrators
and taxpayers to smooth over the rough edges of the
apportionment and allocation provisions when applied to
a particular transaction.22
Section 18 implicitly recognizes that the UDITPA
apportionment formula is a pragmatic political
compromise that shares the tax base among the states
where labor and capital exist and the states where
customers are located. A Nobel Prize winning economist
described the UDITPA formula as: “[t]his simple but
arbitrary and capricious formula has all the earmarks of
having been concocted by a committee of lawyers who had
forgotten anything they ever were taught about statistics
or economics.”23 There is nothing sacrosanct about the
sales factor or the formula; the goal is to adopt a politically
acceptable approach that can be reasonably administered
and one that provides certainty, predictability, and stability.

III. BASIC PRINCIPLES
OF APPORTIONMENT
APPLIED TO CONTENT
PROVIDERS: A SOLUTION
TO THE SALES FACTOR
The content providers generate income in two different
ways. One way is through advertising. The content
providers are paid by national advertisers. The payments
are for the content providers to include the advertising
as part of the programs and movies that they wholesale
to their distributors, such as local broadcast stations,
cable systems, telecom distributors, satellite TV, and
Internet distributors.24
It is important to clearly identify the customers of the
content providers in the case of advertising. The customers
of the content providers are the advertisers. This is the
group that pays the content providers and that generates
their advertising income.
The advertisers sell their own goods and services to
their customers, which might be distributors, retailers,
or end users. In no event, however, will these customers
have any legal relationship with the content providers.
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(In legal terms, no privity of contract exists between the
content providers and the customers of the advertisers.)
For example, if a product advertised on a program
produced by a content provider is defective, the purchaser
of the product would not deal with the content provider.
Indeed, the content providers are even unaware of
the identity or location of the customers that buy their
advertisers’ products.
The second of the two sources of revenue for the content
providers is the licensing of the programs or movies
they produce. The content providers can be viewed as
manufacturers of property—intangible property such as
programs and movies. Their customers or “market” are
the distributors to whom the content is wholesaled. The
distributors are the group that pay the content providers
and that generate their licensing income.
No legal relationship exists between the content providers
and the customers of these distributors. For example, if a
content provider licenses a program or movie to DirecTV
or Netflix, the viewer of that content is DirecTV’s or
Netflix’s customer, not the content provider’s customer.
If a content provider wholesales a program to a national
cable operator, the viewer of that content is the customer
of the local cable system affiliate.25 If a problem develops
with the viewing of the program, the viewer deals with the
cable distributor, not the content provider. The viewers
are likely unaware of who developed the content that they
are viewing. And the content provider is likely unaware of
the identity of the customers of its distributors, the home
or billing addresses they used when they subscribed
to a distributor’s programming package, or where the
customers are physically located when they view the
program or movie.
With respect to the revenue received from licensing their
programs and movies, the content providers are best
analogized to manufacturers. Instead of manufacturing
tangible personal property that is wholesaled to
distributors, they manufacture intangible intellectual
property that is wholesaled to distributors. The only
reason why the destination principle of UDITPA does not
apply is that the product that is manufactured is intangible
rather than tangible.
Because content providers manufacture intangible
property and/or provide advertising services, they
are excluded from UDITPA’s destination principle and
instead are covered by its controversial “all or nothing”
costs of performance rule. To avoid that rule, some
states adopted an audience factor to assign the receipts
of content providers. The earliest states adopted an
audience method in the 1980’s and some other states
followed suit. No legislature, however, has adopted
an audience factor since 2004, perhaps because the
approach suffers from both conceptual and, more recently,
administrative problems.26

Nonetheless, the Massachusetts Department of Revenue
has recently resurrected an audience factor through a
regulation. The Massachusetts Legislature provides that
sales other than the sale of tangible personal property
are in that State and thus included in the numerator of
the Massachusetts sales factor, if “the corporation’s
market for the sale is in the commonwealth.”27 The statute
further provides that “a corporation’s market for the sale”
is considered to be in Massachusetts “in the case of a
service, if and to the extent the service is delivered to a
location in the commonwealth.”28
Under the auspices of this statute, the Department of
Revenue recently adopted a regulation providing that “in
the case of the direct or indirect delivery of advertising
on behalf of a customer to the customer’s intended
audience by electronic means, the service is delivered
in Massachusetts to the extent that the audience for
such advertising is in Massachusetts.”29 Accordingly,
the regulation adopts a “look through rule,” presumably
in an attempt to capture the location of the viewers. The
regulation further provides that “[i]f the taxpayer cannot
determine the state or states where the services are
actually delivered to the end users . . . but has sufficient
information regarding the place of delivery from which it
can reasonably approximate the state or states where the
services are delivered, it shall reasonably approximate
such state or states.”30
Conceptually, this regulation is defective because it
conflates the advertiser’s market with that of the content
providers. The audience factor attempts to calculate the
percentage of viewers by state, but these viewers are not
the customers of the content providers. Moreover, this
look through rule is exactly opposite the rule for sales of
tangible personal property made to distributors. In that
case, the sale would be assigned to the place of delivery
to the distributor and not where the distributor resells
the property as is true under a look through rule like an
audience factor.
The audience factor is defective for administrative reasons
as well. A content provider licensing its intellectual
property to Hulu, Vudu, RIM, Amazon, Google, Yahoo,
Apple, Netflix, DirecTV, or Dish TV, for example, will have
no idea about either the billing address of its licensees’
customers, or where such content might be viewed by these
customers.31 Passengers on Southwest Airline flights
view movies distributed by Dish TV. The content providers
have no idea over which states the viewers are located
when they watch a movie. Anyone on Amtrak between
Boston and Washington can observe riders watching a
movie over the Internet while they pass through six states,
or watching one that they downloaded over the Internet
before starting.32 Even the distributors themselves do not
know where their viewers are located in these cases—and
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if they did, the information would not have to be shared
with the content providers and might well be viewed
as proprietary.
Even if it could be administered--which it cannot--an
audience factor is conceptually defective because it
focuses not on the customers and market of the content
providers, but rather on the customers of their customers.
In other words, the viewers are not customers of the
content providers—they are the customers of: the local
broadcast affiliates; the local cable affiliates; the Internet
distributors like Hulu, Vudu, RIM, Amazon, Google, Yahoo,
Apple, or Netflix; or satellite distributors like Dish TV
or DirecTV. An audience factor would also have to take
into account the international customers of the satellite
distributors and the Internet distributors, which constitute
a growing market.33
For similar reasons, a population factor is also defective
on both conceptual and pragmatic grounds. A population
factor would assign receipts of a content provider using the
relative population of a state. If a state has three percent
of the country’s population, for example, three percent of
the receipts of a content provider would be assigned to the
numerator of that state’s sales factor.
Conceptually, this approach suffers from the same
defect as the audience factor. Even if one assumes that
the viewers of the movies and programs produced by the
content providers are uniformly distributed by relative
population, this approach focuses not on the customers
of the content providers, but rather on the customers of
their customers. The viewers are not the customers of the
content providers.
But the assumption that the viewers are distributed by
relative population of the states is wrong in many situations.
Movies and shows, with their related advertising, are
directed at different racial or ethnic groups, gender
groups, age groups, religious groups, political groups,
geographical groups, sports fans, music fans and the like.
These demographic targets do not necessarily mirror a
state’s relative population.34
To complicate matters further, companies like Hulu,
Amazon, Google, Yahoo, Apple, Netflix, DirecTV, or
Dish TV have international customers, which are an
expanding market.35 A state’s relative population of the
United States would ignore the non-U.S. viewers, thus
overstating a particular state’s share of viewers. Taken
together, the conceptual and pragmatic defects are
fatal to using relative U.S. population for purposes of
attributing the receipts of the content providers and raise
constitutional questions.
The goal of the sales factor should be to assign the
receipts of a content provider based on the location of
its customers, which represents its market. The sales

factor should rely on information that is directly knowable
by the content provider and that can be verified by a
tax administrator. Receipts should be attributed to a
state without undue difficulty and should not be easily
manipulated by taxpayers.
A more reasonable and compelling approach that
satisfies these criteria is to use the state of the customer’s
commercial domicile, the principal place from which the
trade or business of the customer is directed or managed.36
Consequently, it is the place where the customer exercises
control over the programs and movies provided by the
content provider and where decisions about advertising
would typically be made.
The commercial domicile is the counterpart of the
destination rule used for tangible personal property. Just
the way control and possession over tangible personal
property take place in the destination state, control and
possession over the programs or movies provided by the
content providers are likely to occur at their customers’
commercial domiciles, as will decisions about advertising.
The state of the customer’s commercial domicile also
satisfies other criteria for an acceptable sales factor.
It would be only by chance if the customer’s state of
commercial domicile overlapped in any significant degree
with the state of the content provider’s payroll or property,
thereby avoiding a perceived defect with the costs of
performance rule.
The commercial domicile of any publicly traded
corporation can be easily determined through annual
reports or schedules filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Indeed, even without resort
to these documents, the commercial domiciles of
major advertisers or distributors are generally known in
state tax circles.
The commercial domicile is a brick and mortar location,
often involving hundreds of thousands of square feet
and thousands of employees. Changing a commercial
domicile is a very serious and costly matter. No customer
of a content provider will purposely change its commercial
domicile at the request of a content provider. Consequently,
the commercial domicile of a customer cannot be easily
manipulated by a content provider.37
Assigning receipts based on the state of the commercial
domicile of a content provider’s customer provides stability,
predictability, and certainty. Commercial domiciles rarely
change. The brick and mortar location of a commercial
domicile is independent of technological developments,
changes in the business model of content providers, or
innovations in the Internet. It is free of all of the defects
that infect the current approaches.
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Depending on the state, the commercial domicile rule
could be implemented through legislation or under existing
law by regulation or through equitable apportionment
provisions.
Unlike UDITPA’s costs of performance rule, which is
likely to assign all of the receipts to a particular state, a
commercial domicile rule will assign the receipts from
each of the content provider’s customers to different
states. For example, some of the Fortune 500 and their
states of commercial domicile include Office Depot
(Florida), Eli Lilly (Indiana), McDonalds (Illinois), Principal
Financial Group (Iowa), Staples (Massachusetts) and
Lowes (North Carolina). Assigning receipts based on the
customer’s state of commercial domicile will apportion
the business income of a content provider to more states
than will UDITPA’s costs of performance rule.

IV. CONCLUSION
Assigning the sales and receipts of a content provider based
on the state of the commercial domicile of its customer
would modernize the apportionment formula, consistent
with the principles of corporate income taxation.
The use of a commercial domicile rule would bring
stability, predictability, and certainty into the income
taxation of content providers, enhancing a state’s business
climate and providing a reliable source of revenue.
The rule would be easily implemented by taxpayers,
cannot be easily manipulated, and is easily verifiable by
tax administrators. It would capture the actual location of
the customers, which constitute the market of the content
providers.
The rule is free from the conceptual and administrative
defects that plague other approaches, such as an audience
factor or a population factor. Assigning sales based
on the customer’s commercial domicile would greatly
reduce litigation and would free a policy maker from the
need for constant tinkering with the tax law every time
a technological innovation leads to a new way of doing
business for a content provider. This approach has already
been adopted by some states.
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FOOTNOTES
1.

2.

The four national broadcast networks (NBC, ABC, Fox, and CBS) own some
local TV stations, but most local stations are not owned by these four. The
local TV stations are sometimes referred to in the industry as “affiliates”
and the agreements between them and the national broadcast networks are
referred to as “affiliation agreements.” The term “affiliate,” however, is not
intended to denote common ownership or control between the networks and
the local TV stations.
National cable operators typically have numerous local cable systems,
operating as affiliates under franchises granted by the localities in which
they do business. National cable operators receive content with embedded
advertising from the content providers, and provide that as part of a bundled
package to their local cable systems which, in turn, sell packages directly
to subscribers throughout the country. These subscribers are the actual
viewers of the content and advertising wholesaled to the national cable
operators by the content providers.

3.

Satellite television operators sell packages to subscribers throughout the
world.

4.

The Internet distributors allow viewers to purchase content, rent it, or
stream it live. Many of the viewers of the Internet distributors are also cable
customers (notwithstanding that some cable customers can also watch
programs remotely).

5.

In 2007, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC), the successor to the group
that adopted UDITPA, started a project to revise it. Two reporters to the
project were appointed, one of whom is the author of this Paper. In 2009,
after considerable public controversy, the ULC abandoned its efforts. In the
same year, the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) stepped into the breach
and started a project to suggest revisions to five areas of UDITPA. The author
of this Paper served as the Hearing Officer to the MTC. See Report of the
Hearing Officer, Multistate Tax Compact Article IV, Proposed Amendments,
published by Tax Analysts. On July 30, 2014, the Executive Committee of the
MTC approved a number of changes to the language of UDITPA. Suggested
revisions by the MTC have no legal status; they must be adopted by a
legislature to become that state’s law.

6.

For a fuller discussion, see Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Taxation, 7th
ed., 2011, Ch. 10.

7.

Sections 9-17, UDITPA. For a fuller discussion, see Pomp, supra note 6.

8.

Income taxable by a state is the amount of the corporation’s total business
income that is apportioned to the taxing state.

9.

The sales factor is the ratio between a corporation’s sales in the taxing state
divided by its sales everywhere.

10.

The payroll factor is the ratio between a corporation’s payroll in the taxing
state divided by its payroll everywhere.

11.

The property factor is the ratio between a corporation’s property in the taxing
state divided by its property everywhere.

12.

UDITPA has special rules for nonbusiness income, which are not relevant to
this Paper. For a discussion of those rules, see Pomp, supra note 6.

13.

Compared with an evenly-weighted three-factor formula, a double-weighted
sales factor results in increased tax on some corporations and decreased tax
on others and has no effect on corporations that conduct all of their activities
in the state. The tax effect depends on the mathematical relationship between
the sales factor and the property and payroll factors. More specifically,
corporations whose sales factors are less than the average of their
property and payroll factors benefit from a double-weighted sales factor;
other interstate corporations are disadvantaged. The former describes, for
example, corporations with the bulk of their property and payroll in a state
that sell outside that state.

14.

Compared with a double-weighted sales factor, a single sales factor provides
even greater tax benefit to corporations that are primarily producing inside
the taxing state and selling outside that state.

15.

Section 16, UDITPA.

16.

In idiosyncratic situations involving the peculiar structure of a particular
industry, the “distributor” may be an agent of the manufacturer, in which
case a sale by the manufacturer might be assigned to the ultimate customer.
This situation has nothing to do with content providers.

17.

The Executive Committee of the MTC is suggesting a “look through” rule in
the case of marketing intangibles. See Report of the Hearing Officer, supra
note 5, at 51-54.

18.

Section 17, UDITPA.

19.

Criticism of the “all or nothing” approach has led some states to attribute
receipts to a state in proportion to the costs of performance incurred in
that state. To illustrate, consider the situation in the text where a multistate
service provider has 4% of its costs of performance in State A and 3% of its
costs of performance in each of 32 other states. Under a proportionate costs
of performance rule, the taxpayer would assign 4% of its gross receipts to
State A and 3% to each of the 32 other states. For other suggestions about
changing UDITPA’s costs of performance rule, see Report of the Hearing
Officer, supra note 5, at 66-69.

20.

For a rarefied discussion of the differences among the use of a license, the
licensing of an intangible, and the sale of intellectual property, see TGSNOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432 (Tex.2011).

21.

See Report of the Hearing Officer, supra note 5, at 46-54.

22.

For a fuller discussion, see Report of the Hearing Officer, supra note 5, at
14-28.

23.

William Vickrey, The Corporate Income Tax in the U.S. Tax System, 73 Tax
Notes 597, 602 (1996).

24.

The national broadcast and cable networks like Fox, CBS, CNN, MSNBC and
ESPN deal with national advertisers; local businesses that wish to advertise
deal with the local broadcast affiliates and not the content providers.
Similarly, local businesses deal with the local affiliates of the national cable
operators and not with the content providers.

25.

See supra note 2.

26.

California and New York, the first states to adopt an audience method,
continue to be the headquarters of all of the major content providers.
Because the principal business operations of the providers were in California
and New York, those two states adopted the audience method as an economic
incentive to encourage the industry to maintain and grow their businesses
there. This method mitigated the harsh effects of California’s all or nothing
costs of performance rule or of New York’s proportional costs of performance
rule.

27.

Chapter 63, Section 38(f), as amended by St. 2013, c. 46, s. 37 (effective 2014).

28.

Id.

29.

830 CMR 63.38.1(9)(d)4.c.ii(C).

30.

Id.

31.

The well-known Nielsen ratings do not cover Internet distribution or satellite
distribution but only cable operators and local television stations. Even in that
case, the ratings are not refined enough for easy use as an audience factor.
Nielsen ratings are based on geographic areas that are not coterminous with
the boundaries of states (or of the District of Columbia). For example, the
ratings for the Boston area include parts of New Hampshire and Vermont.
The ratings for the District of Columbia area cover five states and the
Philadelphia area covers three states.

32.

It is estimated that nearly a majority of the U.S. population will watch full
episodes of television programs digitally every month in 2014. U.S. Digital
Viewers, eMarketer, April 16, 2014. U.S. advertising revenues from television
content grows larger every year because of content viewed on the Internet.
U.S. Internet Ad Revenue Surpasses Broadcast, Associated Press, April 10,
2014.
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33.

See infra note 35.

34.

See Report of the Hearing Officer, supra note 5, at 53.

35.

According to Netflix’s 2013 Form 10-K, it has more than 44 million streaming
members in over 40 countries enjoying more than one billion hours of TV
shows and movies per month. While some of this is content Netflix created
itself, most is acquired from content providers. Id. at 1, 18, 48. DirecTV has
17.6 million subscribers in Latin America. DirecTV 2013 Form 10-K, p. 13.

36.

UDITPA defines “commercial domicile” to mean the principal place from
which the trade or business of the taxpayer is directed or managed. Section
1(b), UDITPA.

37.

The concept of a commercial domicile is a long-standing feature of both
corporate and tax law, which has not been abused. The states should be able
to deal with any possible manipulation of the concept.
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